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Electronic commerce and ﬂexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized
products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization?
Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how
his decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information
to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers
have diﬀerent tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation
customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a
maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.
Key words: E-Commerce, Personalization, Asymmetric information, Price discrimination
Elektronischer Handel und ﬂexible Produktionstechnologien erm¨ oglichen eine kosteng¨ unstige
Personalisierung ehemals standardisierter Produkte, allerdings ben¨ otigt der Produzent hierf¨ ur
Informationen vom Kunden ¨ uber dessen Pr¨ aferenzen. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass die
Kunden selbst dar¨ uber entscheiden k¨ onnen, in welchem Ausma¨ s sie diese Informationen preis-
geben, wird hier analysiert, wie diese Entscheidung des Kunden mit der Preispolitik eines Mo-
nopolisten interagiert, der mit Hilfe zus¨ atzlicher Informationen zwar das Produkt besser an die
W¨ unsche des Kunden anzupassen vermag, sein Wissen allerdings auch dazu missbrauchen kann,
sich einen gr¨ o¨ seren Anteil des Handelsgewinns anzueignen. Bei heterogenen Pr¨ aferenzen der
Konsumenten zeigt sich sowohl f¨ ur den Fall einer einheitlichen Zahlungsbereitschaft, als auch
f¨ ur den Fall unterschiedlicher Kundentypen mit hoher und niedriger Zahlungsbereitschaft, dass
die Konsumenten nur dann zu einer vollst¨ andigen Informationsrevelation bereit sind, wenn sich
der Monopolist im Vorfeld der Revelationsentscheidung glaubhaft an ein Preisschema binden
kann.
Schlagworte: Elektronische M¨ arkte, Personalisierung, Asymmetrische Information,
Preisdiskriminierung
JEL–classiﬁcation: D42, D82, L142 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
1 Introduction
The concept of a “prosumer” has been introduced in 1980 by the futurist Alvin Toﬄer in his
book “The Third Wave” as a blend of producer and consumer. He imagined a future type of
consumer becoming involved in the design and manufacture of products in a way that they could
be made to individual speciﬁcation. Basing product design decisions appropriately on implicit
or explicit information about customer preferences has always been a key factor for economic
success in any business. Also personalization has been the traditional way of production in
many areas of craftsmanship as for example taylors, shoemakers and the like. However, until
recently manufacturers or national service providers have been restricted to sell standardized
products or at most a limited number of diﬀerentiated goods or services. Electronic commerce,
partially in conjunction with ﬂexible manufacturing, now provides the opportunity to obtain
the information necessary for personalization from customers all over the world at low cost and,
speciﬁcally in the case of digital products, to tailor general-purpose goods or services to the
speciﬁc needs of each customer (“mass customization”).
While personalization enhances the value of a product for the consumer it is not necessarily
in his interest to reveal his personal information. Besides privacy issues (see Varian, 1997)
it are the conﬂicting interests of buyers and sellers that may induce a consumer to refrain
form becoming a prosumer: He must fear that the seller may be able to abuse the information
to obtain a larger share of the total gains from trade. We will discuss this problem in an
asymmetric information game between a potential buyer with private information about his
taste and his willingness to pay, and a monopolist that uses information obtained from the
customer to personalize the product and to optimize his pricing policy.
Our paper is related to some other work that deals with issues in electronic commerce. As in
Bakos (1997) who considers the impact of a reduction in search costs caused by electronic
coordination we assume that product characteristics are located on a Salop circle. The ver-
sioning paper by Varian (2000) is similar to our analysis insofar as consumers may diﬀer with
respect to their willingness to pay. However, while Varian deals with the incentive of sellers to
vend goods of diﬀerent quality, in our model a buyer may signal his valuation by revealing a
speciﬁc amount of his private information. Signalling issues are also addressed in a theoreti-
cal and empirical investigation of used–car trade by Fabel/Lehmann (2002) who argue that
information cost advantages of electronic market places may be oﬀset by an ampliﬁcation of
adverse selection problems. While their research question and their modeling approach diﬀers
from our setting, there are two general aspects that are discussed in both papers: (i) Due to
complications caused by information asymmetries electronic markets do not always deliver the
superior performance that has been claimed by their proponents. (ii) The speciﬁcs of the mar-
ket interaction between seller and buyer may impede the disclosure of information that would
enhance the gains from trade. With respect to information revelation our work is related to
Acquisti/Varian (2001) who explore the behavior of market participants in a setting with
suppliers that are able to observe (for example by way of cookies) whether a potential buyer
is a new customer or not. Finally, our central theme — the interaction of personalization,
mass customization and price discrimination — is discussed in two papers by Ulph and Vulkan1. Introduction 3
(Ulph/Vulkan, 2000 and 2001): Here consumers diﬀer with respect to their most desired
product, and knowledge about the characteristics of their customers allows a ﬁrm to charge
diﬀerent prices. There are two fundamental diﬀerences to our analysis: (i) It is assumed that
ﬁrms already know the speciﬁc taste of each consumer, and (ii) there are two ﬁrms in the
market that compete in price strategies. In Ulph/Vulkan (2000) each ﬁrm is located on
another end-point of an Hotelling line and is only able to price discriminate (but not to person-
alize the product). Mass customization (personalization) is then introduced in Ulph/Vulkan
(2001) and it is shown that in equilibrium ﬁrms often choose both mass customization and price
discrimination although both sellers would be better oﬀ by not adopting the two technologies.
Our work is complementary to the papers by Ulph und Vulkan: (i) We consider the incentives
of consumers (instead of producers) to accept a personalization strategy and to disclose the
relevant information. (ii) To keep the analysis tractable we do assume that the product is
provided by a monopolist (instead of considering duopoly competition), which in our opinion
also helps to highlight the speciﬁc aspects of the decision by the consumer. In this setting we
deal with two distinct eﬀects of information revelation:
• Information about the taste of the consumer enables the monopolist both to customize
the product appropriately and to base his pricing decision on the information obtained.
• Consumers may not only diﬀer with respect to the location in product space but also
with respect to their general willingness to pay for this kind of good. Revealing more or
less information about the location may then also deliver a signal about the valuation of
the customer.
For both cases we ﬁrst consider a situation where potential buyers decide about disclosure of
their private information before the monopolist sets the price. We discuss how the incentive
of the seller to abuse the information obtained makes the buyer reluctant to reveal his infor-
mation. In a second step we show that this problem may be at least partially resolved if price
commitment by the seller is possible.
We obtain two interesting results that both seem to be in line with empirical observations:
• It is crucial for the success of personalization as a business strategy that a ﬁrm is able to
commit to a (maximum) price before consumers have to reveal their private information.
While such a commitment will be possible in cases where a “prosumer” actually chooses
the components of his product (as is done for example when buying a personal computer
from Dell), it may be more diﬃcult to achieve if buyers only provide information about
preferences while the actual production of the good or service is completely in the hands
of the seller.
• In a setting with seller commitment and diﬀerences in the willingness to pay, the equilib-
rium actions consist of no information revelation by low valuation customers (who obtain
a low end standardized product) and personalization for high valuation customers (who
get a high end product tailored to their speciﬁc needs).4 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
In section 2 we consider the case with no commitment and identical valuation. This allows us to
analyze the direct eﬀect of information revelation in isolation and to derive the optimal amount
of information disclosure as a function of a given uniform willingness to pay for a perfectly
personalized product. We extend the analysis to incorporate the indirect eﬀect in section 3,
where we consider a situation with high and low valuation consumers to study how signalling
aspects aﬀect revelation incentives. Finally, in section 4 we show how results change if the
monopolist is able to commit to a maximum price before information is disclosed by the buyer.
Section 5 summarizes our ﬁndings and presents some suggestions for further research.
2 Consumers with identical willingness to pay
We consider a game between a risk neutral monopolist and a continuum of risk neutral con-
sumers located uniformly on a Salop circle (see Salop, 1979). The actual position lc of a
consumer is private information. The monopolist may customize his product by choosing any
location lf. To simplify matters and to enable concentration on information revelation and
signalling issues, production and personalization is assumed to be costless. The perimeter of
the Salop circle is normalized to a value of two which yields a maximum distance |lc −lf| equal
to one.
The consumer may (partially) reveal his position to the monopolist. This is done by choosing
some value i ∈ [0,1] that changes the Salop circle by multiplying the perimeter by 1 − i.
Therefore, i = 0 indicates that no information is revealed while i = 1 stands for telling the
monopolist the exact location lc. For values of i between zero and one, the maximum distance
between lc and lf is reduced so that the product while not perfectly personalized is at least
more likely to be closer to the customer’s location.
The time structure of the game without price commitment is as follows:
• In a ﬁrst step the consumer determines the information revelation parameter i.
• The monopolist then arbitrarily chooses some location lf on the modiﬁed Salop circle and
sets the monopoly price pM.
• Finally the consumer decides about buying the given product at the speciﬁed price by
comparing this price with the utility derived by a product at location lf.
Gross utility of a consumer is given by u = vmax−|lc−lf| where vmax indicates the valuation for a
perfectly personalized product, i. e. a product where locations lc and lf coincide. The consumer
will accept the oﬀer of the monopolist whenever u ≥ p. Without information revelation |lc−lf|
is distributed uniformly between zero and one. The probability of trade is then given by
Pr(u ≥ p)=vmax − p for p ∈ [max{0,v max − 1},v max]. The monopolist will set pM in order
to maximize expected return pPr(u ≥ p)=p(vmax − p). For i>0 we obtain a modiﬁed
demand schedule Pr(u ≥ p)=1 /(1 − i)(vmax − p) — for each price it is now more likely that2. Consumers with identical willingness to pay 5
the consumer accepts the monopolist’s oﬀer. At i = 1 the product is perfectly personalized and
for pM ≤ vmax trade occurs with certainty.
In ﬁgure 1 we attempt to visualize the eﬀects of information revelation: We consider a consumer
with valuation vmax =1 /2 and display inverse demand curves for diﬀerent values of i. All inverse
demand curves start on the price axis at vmax. Note that in our analysis “demand” stands for
the probability of trade — a given consumer either wants to buy one unit of the good or nothing.
For i = 0 demand is given by a falling straight line with a slope of −1, the line gets ﬂatter with
rising i and ﬁnally becomes horizontal at i =1 .
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Based on the linear inverse demand curves it is straightforward to determine the monopoly
solution: For Pr(u ≥ p) < 1 the marginal revenue MR of the risk neutral monopolist is given
by a straight line with twice the slope of the respective demand curve while at Pr(u ≥ p)=1t h e
marginal revenue becomes zero. We can now discuss the implications of the optimal strategies
in the second stage of the game:
• For i ∈ [0,1/2) gains from trade are not assured even if the monopolist chooses the
competitive price p =0 .
• For i ∈ [0,3/4) the monopolist maximizes proﬁts by setting a price pM =1 /4a n da t
this price the probability of trade is always smaller than one (it starts at 1/4f o ri =06 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
and approaches 1 at i =3 /4). Revelation of information up to i =3 /4 thus not only
increases the possible gains from trade but also reduces the monopoly distortion. As can
be seen by a look at the consumer surplus triangles abci and the proﬁt rectangles below,
consumer and monopolist equally share the gains from information revelation.
• Beyond i =3 /4 the monopolist chooses the highest possible price that guarantees trade
for any lc — for example pM =3 /8a ti =7 /8. While this pricing policy ensures an
eﬃcient solution, it also helps the monopolist to increase its share of total surplus which
in turn yields an absolute reduction of expected consumer surplus relative to the situation
at i =3 /4: Triangle abc3/4 is bigger than triangle ab c7/8. Finally, at i = 1 social surplus
will be maximized (each product sold is perfectly personalized), however, all gains from
trade are appropriated by the monopolist.
Given our game structure, the subgame perfect equilibrium is given by partial disclosure of
information i∗ =3 /4 and a resulting monopoly price pM(i∗)=1 /4. While at this equilibrium
monopoly distortions in the pricing decision are eliminated, some asymmetry of information
remains and thus total surplus is not maximized.
Having started with a situation where in the initial situation without information revelation
gains from trade are not assured, we will now discuss how higher valuations vmax will aﬀect
revelation incentives. In ﬁgure 2 we compare the results obtained for vmax =1 /2w i t ht w o
additional situations: For vmax = 1 trade would take place even without any information
disclosed at the competitive price pC = 0, however, monopoly pricing yields a probability of
trade below one. This monopoly distortion will be absent at vmax = 2 (and also for higher
values of vmax).
As can easily be seen, the amount of information revelation in equilibrium decreases with rising
consumer valuation because the elimination of the monopoly distortion is assured for lower
values of i:F o rvmax = 1 we obtain equilibrium strategies (i∗,p ∗)=( 1 /2,1/2); for vmax ≥ 2
information revelation is no longer in the interest of the consumer and (i∗,p ∗)=( 0 ,v max − 1).





for vmax ∈ [0,2] (1)
A second interesting point that can be visualized in ﬁgure 2 is the maximum improvement in
total surplus that may be realized by information revelation. While the relative change is larger
the smaller vmax, the absolute eﬀect by revealing all information is maximized at vmax =1 :T h e
potential gain is given by the area abcde which is bigger than the triangle a b c  that represents
t h es a m ee ﬀ e c tf o rvmax = 2 and, exceeding 1/2, is also bigger than the eﬀect for vmax =1 /2.
To sum up our results in this section: (i) While disclosing all information would allow to
perfectly personalize the product and thus maximize total surplus, choosing this strategy is not
in the interest of the consumer because the monopolist would fully appropriate this surplus.
(ii) Partial revelation of information is the optimal strategy for a potential buyer as long as the
probability for trade in the game without information revelation is below one. (iii) The lower the3. Two types of consumers and signalling 7
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valuation of a consumer, the more information she will disclose in equilibrium. (iv) The relative
change in total surplus that may be realized by revealing all information monotonically decreases
with the valuation of the consumer, however, the absolute change approaches a maximum at
vmax =1
3 Two types of consumers and signalling
After having discussed the situation with uniform valuation for the perfectly personalized prod-
uct, we do now consider the case where consumers diﬀer with respect to their willingness to pay.
We maintain the assumption that price commitment is not feasible and thus the time structure
is the same as in section 2. To keep the analysis tractable we assume that there are only two
types of consumers, t = {h,l}, with both types equally likely and h indicating high valuation
consumers with vmax =1a n dl referring to low valuation customers with vmax =1 /2. We also
restrict the strategy space of buyers: The amount of information revelation may either be zero
(labeled in for “no information revealed”), i =1 /2( is for “some information revealed”) or i =1
(ia for “all information revealed”). We have chosen these values for the following reasons: (i)
i =1 /2 represents the optimal value for the high valuation consumer and existence of a pure8 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
strategy separating equilibrium seems to be most likely at this optimal value. (ii) To reveal
all information has been included as an option because there might exist a pooling equilibrium
where this strategy is chosen. Also, as will be shown in section 4, disclosing all information is
an equilibrium action for the high valuation consumer if the monopolist can commit in advance
to some maximum price.
3.1 Strategies, Beliefs and Payoﬀs
Following the standard backward induction logic we start at the end of the game, where the
consumer has to decide whether he will buy the product at the speciﬁed price. Note that
the consumer’s buying decision not only depends on the price but also on his type and on the
distance between the locations lc and lf. Because in general neither the exact location lc nor the
type of consumer is known to the monopolist, he faces a demand curve that provides him with
the (subjective) probability of trade for a given price. While the monopolist cannot directly
charge diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent types, the price may depend on the signal observed. When
receiving signal i, the monopolist will assign some probability that the sender of such a signal
is of type h. Assume now that these beliefs are correct (as they will be on the equilibrium
path) and denote by θi the actual proportion of type h consumers as a fraction of all customers
that choose some signal i. Under this assumption we obtain (conditional) demand functions
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(4)
The demand curves are kinked at pi =1 /2 because at prices above 1/2 only customers of type
h may buy the product. We get the total expected demand Q by summing up the products
wixi where wi denotes the share of consumers that have chosen to send signal i: Q =
 
i wixi.
Note that wi has no eﬀect on the pricing decision of the monopolist since we assume that he
will set his price after receiving signal i: Conditional on the signal i ∈{ in,i s,i a} he has been
observing, the monopolist will choose a price pM
i to solve the proﬁt maximization problem:
p
M




i =a r gm a x
pi
wi · pi · xi(pi,θ i)( 5 )
While wi has no eﬀect on pM
i , the proﬁt maximizing price at some signal i depends on the
respective proportion of high valuation customers, θi. As we have stated above, this actual
proportion has to match the monopolist’s belief for each information set (that is, signal i)3. Two types of consumers and signalling 9
which will be reached in the game with positive probability. Solving the the maximization
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(8)
Based on these considerations we are now able to determine the expected utility E[ut|i = i] ≡ ut
i
of a type t consumer who has chosen strategy i in the ﬁrst stage of the game. This expected
utility depends on the probability of gains from trade Pr(ut ≥ pi) and the expected consumer









The consumers’ expected utility is aﬀected by pi in two ways: First the price has an inﬂuence
on the purchasing decision as higher prices will reduce the probability of gains from trade.
Moreover, in case of buying the product, consumer surplus will be lower the higher the price.
Given the information about the pricing decision of the monopolist from equations (6) to (8)
we can derive the expected utility for both types of consumers at any strategy i ∈{ in,i s,i a}
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(15)
Based on these payoﬀ functions and the proﬁt function in (5) it is now straightforward to
determine the equilibria of the signalling game.10 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
3.2 Equilibria of the signalling game
In a signalling game we have to consider three possible types of equilibria: Pooling equilibria
where no information is revealed, separating equilibria where the signal gives perfect informa-
tion about the type and semi-separating equilibria where some types play mixed strategies. To
obtain these equilibria we apply the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that combines
subgame perfection with Bayesian updating in order to obtain reasonable beliefs on the equi-
librium path. Where appropriate, we add some additional reﬁnements to rule out unreasonable
out–of–equilibrium beliefs. In a ﬁrst step we restrict attention to pure strategies and check
whether any combination of signals (i(h),i(l)) by the low and high valuation type yields an
equilibrium at permissible beliefs of the monopolist. However, as will be shown no separat-
ing equilibrium exists and the existing pooling equilibria are only supported by unreasonable
out–of–equilibrium beliefs. Thus, in a second step, we consider mixed strategies and derive a
semi-separating equilibrium that seems to be the most likely outcome of the game.
3.2.1 Pooling equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium both types of consumers choose the same strategy sh = sl = sp
c and
therefore disclose the same amount of information i about their location. At the equilibrium
path the monopolist updates its belief according to Bayes’ rule, properly assuming that both
types l and h play the equilibrium strategy with probability one. Thus in any pooling equi-
librium the monopolist’s ex-post belief will comply with the common prior distribution of the
consumer types, i. e. he still assesses a probability of 1/2 for each type. In a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium it is assumed that the monopolist is free to chose any out–of–equilibrium beliefs if
he observes a deviation from the equilibrium path. Thus a pooling equilibrium has to satisfy
the following conditions:
• The monopolist’s beliefs are consistent with common priors that are updated according to
Bayes rule whenever possible. On the equilibrium path of the pooling equilibrium beliefs
therefore correspond to the common prior distribution of types h and l: θi|i=s
p
c =1 /2.
• Given some out–of–equilibrium beliefs of the monopolist (i. e. for i  = sp
c), neither type
has an incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy.
These requirements are suﬃcient to eliminate a pooling equilibrium where both consumer types
do not disclose any information, i. e. choose strategy in. In accordance with an equilibrium
belief θn =1 /2 such a strategy would result in a monopoly price pn =3 /8. However, a type h
consumer would have an incentive to deviate: Choosing strategy is would generate an expected
utility between 1/4a n d1 /2 (the exact value depends on the ﬁrm’s belief θs) while the expected
utility of strategy in just amounts to the lower value of 25/128.
However, two other pooling equilibria may be constructed by assuming extreme beliefs at the
deviation paths:3. Two types of consumers and signalling 11
• An equilibrium (P1) where both types choose sp
c = is, i. e. partially disclose their location
information, is sustained by the customers fear that a deviation will be interpreted by
the monopolist as a signal for a high willingness to pay. To be more exact, the beliefs
θs =1 /2 at the equilibrium path and θa > 1/2a n dθn = 1 oﬀ the equilibrium path
support this pooling equilibrium. The corresponding price strategy sM
c of the monopolist
is characterised by ps =1 /2, pn =1 /2a n dpa =1 .
• An pooling equilibrium (P2) with sp
c = ia, i. e. both types reveal all information, can be
supported in a similar manner if the monopolist has a belief of θa =1 /2 at the equilibrium
path and expects the consumer to be of type h with probability θs > 1/2a n dθn =1 ,
respectively, when observing a deviation. The corresponding prices are pa =1 /2, pn =1 /2
and ps =1 /2.
Although both pooling equilibria are Perfect Bayesian Equilibra, forward induction arguments
render them quite unreasonable: Note that in both pooling equilibria, P1 and P2, the high
valuation consumer would be strictly worse of if he deviates while type l is just indiﬀerent
between all strategies. However, the out–of–equilibrium beliefs assert that the monopolist
assumes that type l will deviate with a lower probability! Also note that equilibrium P1 is
pareto dominated by P2, while P2 can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (see Cho/Kreps,
1987): For any out–of–equilibrium belief of the monopolist the type h consumer cannot beneﬁt
by deviating from the equilibrium strategy. Thus, for this type of consumer, any action outside
P2 is equilibrium dominated. This is not the case for type l: Deviation to in will be proﬁtable
if the monopolist does assign a suﬃciently low probability for deviations by type h (for whom,
as just discussed, this action is equilibrium dominated and thus quite unlikely).
3.2.2 Pure strategy separating equilibria
Now consider separating equilibria: In a separating equilibrium each type of a player must
choose a diﬀerent pure strategy. Playing an equilibrium strategy st = i(t) will thus inform the
seller that the consumer is of type t and the monopolist will update his beliefs accordingly.
Updating will thus result in a belief of θi|i=sh = 1 if the equilibrium strategy of type h has been
observed while the monopolist will base its pricing decision on θi|i=sl = 0 when the equilibrium
strategy assigned to type l has been played. When he observes a strategy that deviates from any
equilibrium path, the monopolist is once again free to choose any belief about the customer’s
type.
Obviously, no type will reveal all information:
• L e tu sﬁ r s tc o n s i d e rt y p eh:C h o o s i n gia would yield a price pa = 1. This can not be
an equilibrium strategy because the expected utility of the consumer equals zero and is
therefore lower than for any other strategy (especially compared with a strategy that
imitates the l-type consumer).12 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
• A separating equilibrium where the low valuation consumer discloses all information is
also not feasible. In this case the monopolist would set a price pa =1 /2w h i c hg i v e sa n
incentive for type h to mimic type l.
Thus only two candidates for a separating equilibrium remain:
• First consider the strategy proﬁle {(sh = in,s l = is),(pn =1 /2,p s =1 /4,p a =1 ) } com-
bined with the corresponding beliefs {θn =1 ,θs =0 ,θ a > 1/2}, that is, the monopolist
expects the sender to be of type h when no information is revealed while is signals type l.
Provided these beliefs, however, the high valuation customer could do better if he mimics
the type l consumer: Sending a signal in would increase his expected utility from 1/8t o
1/2.
• The reverse case can be ruled out in a similar manner: Consider strategy proﬁle ({sl =
in,s h = is},{pn =1 /4,p s =1 /2,p a =1 }) and beliefs {θn =0 ,θ s =1 ,θ a > 1/2}. Again
type h has an incentive to mimic the low valuation consumer because that would raise
his expected surplus from 1/4t o9 /32.
As a consequence no pure strategy separating equilibria exist in the signalling game.
3.2.3 Mixed strategies and Semi–separating equilibrium
We now proceed by examining the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in which at least one
type randomizes over his pure strategies. Whenever the probability distributions applied for
randomizing diﬀer between the two types, the monopolist is able to update his prior beliefs
when observing some signal i. If only one type plays some strategy with positive probability,
the monopolist obtains perfect information when he observes this signal. We therefore will refer
to the latter case as a semi-separating equilibrium.
First note that neither type will chooses complete information disclosure with positive prob-
ability in any mixed strategy equilibrium: Type l will never play ia because he obtains zero
utility from this strategy (ia is thus weakly dominated by is and in). Now suppose that the
monopolist has observed a consumer playing strategy ia:A c c o r d i n gt ot h er e a s o n i n ga b o v et h e
only consistent belief is to assume that the sender is of type h with probability θa =1 .T h u s
the seller will set a price pa = 1 which yields zero utility to the consumer. As a consequence,
neither type will completely reveal his information to the monopolist.
Therefore we can restrict attention to mixed strategy equilibria where both types play only the
pure strategies in and is with positive probability. Now consider a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which type t chooses strategy i with probability wt
i. Note that for each type of customer the
probabilities wt
n and wt





n, we can identify the randomization strategy of a player of type3. Two types of consumers and signalling 13
t by wt
n only. Based on the respective probability of each type we are also able to derive the















Note that a player who is willing to randomize between pure strategies has to be indiﬀerent
between playing any of the pure strategies that he plays with positive probability in the mixed
strategy. Applied to our case his expected utility has to be the same whether he chooses in or


























Similarly, a low valuation consumer has to be indiﬀerent between in and is, when choosing to




























Now we must consider three possible scenarios:
• First let us assume that only type l randomizes. In this case wh
n will either be zero or one
while wl
n has to lie between these values. Hence type h chooses a pure strategy.
• Similarly type h may choose a mixed strategy while type l decides in favour of strategy
in or is.
• If both types choose mixed strategies, the solution to the game will correspond to the
solution of a linear system that consists of equations (19) and (21).
An examination of all these cases shows that a unique semi-separating Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium in mixed strategies exists: Only consumers of type h randomize between in and is while
the low valuation customers always conceal their location information. To be more precise, the
equilibrium is characterised by a strategy proﬁle (s∗
f,s ∗
c) ≡{ (sh = wh
n =
√
2/2 − 1/2,s l =14 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
wl




s =1 /2,p ∗
a =1 ) }. From equations (16) and 17) we receive the




s =1 ,θ ∗
a > 1/2)}.
The expected utility for both consumer types, ul and uh, can then be calculated by using the
































To compute the expected total proﬁt, ΠM, we must ﬁrst determine total demand Q.N o t et h a t
we obtain the signal proportions wi by adding up the respective conditional probabilities and
recognising the common prior distribution of the types: wi =( wh
i + wl
i)/2. To determine total













































By inserting the equilibrium values of θ∗
i , p∗
i, wt
i, and demand functions (2) to (4) into equation





c)=( 1 − 2p
∗




























































Note that total proﬁt of the monopolist and consumer surplus of the high valuation type are
lower than in the (unreasonable) pooling equilibrium P2, while both high valuation customer
and the monopolist receive exactly the same payoﬀ values as in the less eﬃcient pooling equi-
librium P1. However, the low valuation consumer is better oﬀ because he will now obtain a
positive expected surplus, while this surplus does not exceed zero when a pooling equilibrium
P1 or P2 is played. Therefore, the ineﬃcient pooling equilibrium P1 is also dominated by the
semi-separating equilibrium.
To summarize the arguments mentioned above, both pooling equilibria P1 and P2 fail to resist
to some forward induction arguments: (i) P1 does not appear to be a reasonable equilibrium
because of two reasons: Firstly, it is pareto dominated by the semi-separating equilibrium.
Secondly, it is based on implausible beliefs. (ii) P2 can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
As a consequence, the semi-separating equilibrium — which is indeed not aﬀected by any
reﬁnements — remains as the only reasonable outcome of the signalling game.4. Price commitments and screening 15
4 Price commitments and screening
Until now we have assumed that the consumer ﬁrst chooses the amount of information dis-
closed and, observing this choice, the monopolist decides on his product location and the proﬁt
maximizing price oﬀer. While the timing with respect to the location decision seems quite
reasonable, the monopolist might have an incentive to set his price before the consumer moves.
Such a commitment is likely to be feasible under the speciﬁc assumptions of our model, how-
ever, it might be more diﬃcult to obtain in more realistic settings where the exact product
location may aﬀect production costs and a priori unknown extra costs for full personalization
may exist.
Nevertheless we will now consider how our results change if we allow the monopolist to post a
price oﬀer in stage zero of the game, i. e. before the consumer chooses i. Note that such an oﬀer
could be made binding insofar as a higher price is no longer feasible by signing an enforceable
contract stating that the product has to be provided at the prespeciﬁed price. However, because
it might be in the interest of both seller and buyer to reduce this price if the consumer has
disclosed less information than expected (i. e. deviated from the equilibrium path), the contract
must be renegotiation proof in the following sense: Even after a pareto improving reduction of
the price a deviating consumer must get a lower utility than he would get in the equilibrium.
The idea behind this restriction on feasible price oﬀers may be best illustrated in the setting
with only one type. Consider the case of a consumer with vmax = 1. As shown in section
2, the privately optimal amount of information revelation by such a consumer is given by
i∗ =1 /2 and the monopolist will accordingly set a price p∗ =1 /2. While this yields eﬃcient
consumption (the price is low enough to ensure that the product is sold for any location lf
chosen by the monopolist), total surplus is not maximized because the product is not perfectly
personalized. This is due to the fear of the consumer that after choosing i = 1 the seller would
set a price pM(i = 1) = 1 which yields zero surplus for the buyer. By choosing the equilibrium
value i∗ =1 /2, however, the consumer can ensure an expected utility E[uh|i =1 /2] = 1/4.
What happens if the monopolist commits to a price pM = 1? At ﬁrst sight it seems as if an
equilibrium (ie =1 ,p e = 1) could be realized. However, suppose that the consumer deviates
from this equilibrium by choosing i<1: If the seller insists on pe = 1 no trade occurs and both
consumer and monopolist obtain zero surplus. The seller would therefore have an incentive to
post a second oﬀer that yields at least some probability of trade. Given these considerations, we
must determine the optimal deviation of the consumer (the equilibrium amount of information
disclosed in the game without commitment) and restrict the range of feasible price oﬀers to
these that guarantee at least the consumer surplus obtained under optimal deviation. In our
example the expected utility is 1/4 if the consumer chooses i∗ =1 /2 instead of ie =1a n dt h u s
the price oﬀer may not exceed p =3 /4 (which yields a consumer surplus of 1/4a ti =1 ) .A s
easily can be shown the optimal price oﬀer pPC (with “PC” standing for “price commitment”)
is generally given by pPC = vmax − (1 − i∗)/2 and applying the formula for i∗ in equation (1)
from section 2 we obtain
p
PC(vmax)=3 /4vmax for vmax ∈ [0,2] (30)16 Would you like to be a Prosumer?
In the case with an homogenous willingness to pay we thus obtain the following result: The
ability to set the monopoly price before the consumer decides about information revelation
makes it possible to implement the surplus maximizing equilibrium (iPC =1 ,p PC =3 /4vmax
(for vmax ∈ [0,2] — for higher vmax we get pPC = vmax−1/2). In this equilibrium the monopolist
commits to not expropriate a consumer that reveals its information: This is done by setting
a price that oﬀers a consumer surplus equal to that obtained for optimal revelation in the
situation without commitment.
How does the analysis extend to the case with two types? Pooling equilibria are not aﬀected
because higher prices than p∗ =1 /2 would yield no trade with the low valuation type (and
thus no pooling) and committing to a lower price is not in the interest of the monopolist.
When considering separating equilibria, however, commitment by the monopolist completely
changes the situation: In section 3 there only existed a semi–separating equilibrium where
the high valuation consumer partially disclosed information with positive probability. Now we
are able to show that the monopolist may separate the two types by setting a pricing menu
(pa =3 /4,p n =1− 1/
√
2).
The argument goes as follows: (i) At this menu type h has just no incentive to choose in to
mimic type l because without information revelation his expected utility at p =1−1/
√
2i sj u s t
equal to 1/4, the utility derived for sure if he chooses ia. (ii) A separating equilibrium where
the low valuation type reveals more information than the consumer with the higher willingness
to pay is neither feasible (type h would always have an incentive to mimic typ l)n o ri nt h e
interest of the monopolist (even if separation would work it would yield lower proﬁts than the
price menu considered above). (iii) There does not exist a combination of prices (pa,p s)t h a t
form a separating equilibrium: At pa =3 /4 the price ps that ensures that type h would not
like to mimic type l must be at least 1/2 and at this price there would be no trade with a type
l consumer. Finally we have to check whether a marginal reduction of pa that allows a price
ps < 1/2 would be in the interest of the monopolist. This would be the case if the additional
proﬁt ps(1 − 2ps) exceeds the proﬁt loss due to the necessary reduction of pa which is given
by 1/2 − ps. The resulting condition 2ps − 2p2
s − 1/2 > 0, however, cannot be fulﬁlled in the
relevant range ps ∈ [0,1/2].
5C o n c l u s i o n
Would you like to be a prosumer and reveal detailed information about your preferences to a
seller? We showed in a monopoly setting how the answer to this question might depend on
your valuation of the product and on the commitment ability of the monopolistic seller you are
facing:
• We ﬁrst considered a situation where consumers diﬀer with respect to the exact location
in product space but have an identical valuation for the perfectly personalized product. In
this setting a prospective buyer will provide all information necessary for personalization5. Conclusion 17
if the monopolist is able to commit to a maximum price before he obtains this message.
However, if commitment is not feasible, a consumer will only disclose some information.
While this strategy reduces expected total surplus, it is chosen by the buyer to avoid
total extraction of the surplus by the seller. In this setting we obtained the result that
the lower the probability of trade without disclosure (i. e. lower valuation) the larger the
amount of information revealed.
• Matters get more complicated if consumers also diﬀer with respect to their willingness
to pay. In this case a signalling game results where low valuation consumers have an
interest to be distinguishable from types with a high willingness to pay in order to obtain
a lower price while high valuation consumers want to avoid expropriation of surplus and
also have an incentive to mimic the type with the low willingness to pay. These eﬀects
render disclosure of information less attractive and thus without price commitment by the
monopolist there only exist pooling equilibria with quite unreasonable beliefs and a mixed
strategy separating equilibrium where only the high valuation consumers reveals part of
his information with positive probability.If, however, the monopolist is able to commit in
advance to some maximum price, we have a screening game where the monopolist oﬀers
a menu of prices as a function of the amount of information disclosed. In this setting a
pure strategy separating equilibrium exists where types with a high willingness to pay get
a personalized product at a relatively high price while low valuation consumers provide
no information and obtain a standardized but much cheaper product.
Note that the personalization strategy of the online computer seller Dell is a prominent example
that is in line with the results of our theoretical analysis: (i) Personalization is a potentially
successful business strategy when price commitment by the seller is feasible. This is the case
here: Each component at Dell has a price tag and the total price of the system is calculated
before the buyer makes his ﬁnal decision (and thus reveals the private information). (ii) In
addition to the perfectly personalized computer, Dell also frequently oﬀers some standardized
systems at a lower price (compared to a personalized computer with similar components). This
is exactly the pattern, our model with low and high valuation consumers predicts.
However, one should be aware that we obtained our result in a model where personalization is
costless and thus we are likely to overstate the potential of personalization. On the other hand,
introducing competition might reduce the monopoly power of the seller and thus consumers
may be less reluctant to provide the information. It should thus be interesting to combine the
duopoly model from Ulph/Vulkan (2001) with the information revelation approach discussed
in the present analysis. Another promising generalization is the consideration of a continuum
of signals and/or types in the signalling game.References
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